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“[W]e are not inclined to carve out an approach to administrative 
review good for tax only.”1 
“[T]he standard doctrines of administrative law . . . should not be 
taken too rigidly.”2 
INTRODUCTION 
“Tax exceptionalism” holds that, like the animals of an island 
long cut off from a continent, the administrative law of tax has 
evolved into different forms than those found in general 
administrative law. Critics of tax exceptionalism take a dim view of 
this diversity, contending that general principles of administrative law 
should apply in the tax context just as they do in other contexts. This 
approach’s virtues include simplicity, elegance, and commitment to 
the rule-of-law concept that the law should be the same everywhere 
and for everyone. It runs the risk, however, of downplaying the 
virtues of pragmatism, flexibility, and realism. An objective look at 
the evolution of administrative law in the United States indicates that 
it is, and will likely forever remain, a muddled mess in important 
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 1. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 713 (2011). 
 2. Wos v. E.M.A. ex rel. Johnson, 133 S. Ct. 1391, 1403 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring) 
(quoting Louis Jaffe, Administrative Law: Burden of Proof and Scope of Review, 79 HARV. L. 
REV. 914, 918 (1966)). 
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respects. This Essay’s simple contention is that courts and other 
commentators should give due weight to the history and virtues of 
this mess—and consider embracing the pragmatism and flexibility 
that it enables—before killing off more mutations from the island of 
misfit tax administrative law doctrines. 
Two of the most prominent examples of tax exceptionalism 
implicate the authority of the Treasury Department (Treasury) to 
promulgate “general authority” regulations pursuant to 26 
U.S.C. § 7805(a), which authorizes Treasury to “prescribe all needful 
rules and regulations for the enforcement” of the Internal Revenue 
Code (IRC). Controversy has existed regarding whether Treasury’s 
general authority regulations may be eligible for Chevron deference, 
which requires courts to defer to an agency’s reasonable 
interpretation of a statute that it administers.3 Also, until recently, 
Treasury had long maintained that its general authority regulations 
were categorically “interpretative,” and therefore did not require 
notice-and-comment procedures under the Administrative Procedure 
Act (APA).4 Scholars, led by Professor Kristin Hickman, have made 
powerful arguments to the contrary.5 Notably, both the Chevron gap 
and the notice-and-comment gap implicate one of the most slippery 
and confusing phrases in administrative law—the “force of law.” 
Chevron deference applies to agency statutory constructions that 
carry the force of law, and agencies are generally supposed to use the 
notice-and-comment process to promulgate legislative rules carrying 
the force of law. 
In 2011, the Supreme Court put an end to the Chevron gap by 
holding in Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. 
United States6 that Chevron deference does indeed apply to certain 
general authority Treasury regulations—which therefore must possess 
 
 3. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 839–40 (1984). 
For a discussion of the evolution of the Chevron doctrine, see infra Part I.  
 4. See Kristin E. Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, 66 VAND. L. REV. 465, 495 
(2013) (observing that Treasury has long taken the view that rules promulgated pursuant to its 
general authority are interpretative rules); id. (noting that the Internal Revenue Service recently 
“has amended the Internal Revenue Manual (“IRM”) to acknowledge that at least some 
general authority regulations may be legislative rules”); id. (noting that notwithstanding this 
amendment, Treasury continues to assert that notice-and-comment procedures are not required 
for general authority rulemaking). 
 5. See generally Kristin E. Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines: Examining Treasury’s 
(Lack of) Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 82 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1727 (2007). 
 6. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. and Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011). 
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the force of law.7 This closing of the Chevron gap might suggest a 
speedy end to the notice-and-comment gap, too. The argument might 
run as follows: Mayo establishes that at least some general authority 
regulations carry the force of law; interpretative rules do not carry the 
force of law; and Treasury must therefore have been wrong to claim 
that its general authority rules are categorically interpretative rather 
than legislative. It should follow that Treasury should, contrary to its 
longstanding practice, use notice-and-comment procedures to issue at 
least those general authority regulations that carry the force of law.8 
In short, it is tempting to read Mayo as a sign that Treasury has badly 
misunderstood the APA’s rulemaking requirements for many 
decades and had better start using notice-and-comment procedures 
for at least some of its general authority rules. 
This Essay does not defend its own definitive resolution to the 
notice-and-comment gap; instead, it proposes an attitude. As courts 
assess an important administrative practice that is many decades old, 
they should be at once pragmatic and conservative. The consequences 
of aggressive application of notice-and-comment requirements to 
Treasury’s general authority rules could be substantial and 
unfortunate.9 Due respect for both historical practice and the law of 
unintended consequences suggests that courts should, if they properly 
can, avoid such a result. Of course, courts cannot ignore clear law 
even if it has unfortunate policy consequences. The pertinent 
administrative law does not, however, seem so clear as to exclude 
room for courts to shape and implement this law in a pragmatic spirit 
that cares about consequences. 
This Essay proceeds in two parts. Part I sets the stage for further 
discussion by examining the Supreme Court’s recent fix of the 
Chevron gap in Mayo. Two lessons emerge from this examination. 
First, the Chevron doctrine, on brief inspection, provides an excellent 
 
 7. Id. at 713 (citation omitted). 
 8. See Hickman, supra note 4, at 468 (noting this tension). 
 9. See generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Which Institution Should Determine Whether an 
Agency’s Explanation of a Tax Decision is Adequate?: A Response to Steve Johnson, 64 DUKE 
L.J. ONLINE 1, 12 (2014) (describing the consequences of forcing Treasury to use modern 
notice-and-comment as “devastating”).  Later in his essay, Professor Pierce explains that judicial 
enforcement of statutory bars on pre-enforcement review of tax rules could mitigate this 
damage. Id. at 16–18. Even if courts applied these statutory bars to full effect, however, 
Treasury would have to expect judicial review of its rules as a defense in enforcement actions. 
As such, the unavailability of pre-enforcement review might do little to reduce the upfront 
investment that Treasury would need to make as it promulgates rules through notice-and-
comment.   
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demonstration of the courts’ flexible approach to the APA—which 
they sometimes “interpret” with marvelous aggression, and 
sometimes ignore. Second, viewed from one angle, Mayo represents a 
formalist impulse to simplify deference doctrine with a one-size-fits-
all approach. Viewed from another, broader angle, however, Mayo is 
consistent with administrative law’s pragmatic impulses—it fixes an 
unnecessary doctrinal complication at a very cheap price. In Part II, 
the focus turns to the notice-and-comment gap. Here, again, we see 
strong evidence of judicial creativity regarding administrative law. 
Courts have essentially rewritten the APA’s notice-and-comment 
provisions, transforming them from an easy and straightforward 
mechanism in 1946 into their current monstrous form. Aggressive 
application to Treasury of notice-and-comment rulemaking à la 2014 
could prove very costly. Moreover, a decision to do so would 
necessarily turn on administrative law’s famously murky attempts to 
draw the line between “interpretative” and “legislative” rules. Given 
the law’s lack of clarity, the potential costs of fixing the notice-and-
comment gap, and the courts’ integral role in creating these costs, 
courts should, at the least, give Treasury the benefit of any doubt on 
the issue of whether its general authority regulations are 
“interpretative”—even if it takes quite a bit of interpretative effort by 
the courts to do so. 
I.  IGNORING THE APA, CHEVRON DEFERENCE,  
AND MAYO’S CHEAP FIX 
Section 706(2) of the APA instructs reviewing courts that they 
shall: 
hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions 
found to be— 
. . . 
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; 
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or 
short of statutory right; 
(D) without observance of procedure required by law . . . .10 
A naïve reader might be forgiven for thinking that this provision 
makes plain that courts, not agencies, are to determine issues of law 
 
 10. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2012). 
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embedded in agency actions. This straightforward reading of the 
APA is consistent with centuries of judicial declarations of 
interpretative supremacy, Marbury v. Madison11 foremost among 
them, to the effect that “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of 
the judicial department to say what the law is.”12 
This reading is also consistent, however, with centuries of 
sensible judicial declarations that courts should defer to reasonable 
agency statutory interpretations.13 These two ideas do not need to 
contradict. The courts can be in charge of determining statutory 
meaning but, as they do so, can also choose to give substantial weight 
to an agency’s statutory interpretation as a source of helpful 
information. Often, courts have justified deference based on agency 
expertise. For instance, courts have stated that deference to agency 
statutory constructions devised near the time of a statute’s adoption 
may be proper because the agency officials possess valuable 
information regarding legislative intent—they may even have helped 
draft the language at issue.14 Other justifications have related to 
systemic concerns about protecting legal stability and reliance 
interests. Thus, longstanding, consistent agency statutory 
constructions have been entitled to great weight and should not be 
“overturned except for cogent reasons.”15 
Over time, various forms of judicial deference have come to be 
associated with the names of influential cases. Skidmore v. Swift & 
Co.,16 which was decided in 1944 just two years before the APA’s 
adoption, has provided a particularly durable moniker.17 Regarding 
judicial review of agency statutory constructions, Justice Jackson 
famously advised in Skidmore that 
[w]e consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of 
the Administrator under this Act, while not controlling upon the 
courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of 
experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may 
 
 11. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 12. Id. at 177. 
 13. See, e.g., United States v. Vowell, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 368, 372 (1810) (“If the question 
had been doubtful, the court would have respected the uniform construction which it is 
understood has been given by the treasury department of the United States upon similar 
questions.”). 
 14. United States v. Moore, 95 U.S. 760, 763 (1877). 
 15. United States v. Chi., N. Shore & Milwaukee R.R. Co., 288 U.S. 1, 13 (1933). 
 16. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
 17. Id. at 134.  
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properly resort for guidance. The weight of such a judgment in a 
particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its 
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with 
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it 
power to persuade, if lacking power to control.18 
In the parlance of general administrative law, “Skidmore deference” 
or, equivalently, “Skidmore respect,” thus stands for the idea that 
courts should pay attention to an agency’s construction of a statute 
that it administers, giving the agency’s analysis whatever weight it 
reasonably deserves. 
In the field of tax, a similar idea has applied but gone by another 
case name. In 1979, just five years before Chevron, the Court decided 
National Muffler Dealers Ass’n v. United States.19 In it, the Court 
offered the following guide for review: 
A regulation may have particular force if it is a substantially 
contemporaneous construction of the statute by those presumed to 
have been aware of congressional intent. If the regulation dates 
from a later period, the manner in which it evolved merits inquiry. 
Other relevant considerations are the length of time the regulation 
has been in effect, the reliance placed on it, the consistency of the 
Commissioner’s interpretation, and the degree of scrutiny Congress 
has devoted to the regulation during subsequent re-enactments of 
the statute.20 
“National Muffler deference” thus combines, among other threads: 
(a) the traditional idea that a statutory construction adopted shortly 
after the enactment of the underlying statute merits special weight, 
and (b) concepts from Skidmore deference. 
In 1984, the Court unleashed Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc.21 Its two-step test commands courts 
reviewing an agency’s construction of a statute it administers to check 
whether Congress has spoken directly to the precise issue in question 
and, if Congress has not, to affirm the agency’s construction so long as 
it is “permissible”—i.e., reasonable.22 The Court gave two different 
types of explanation for this deference—one rooted in authority and 
the other in competence. First, it declared that ambiguous language in 
 
 18. Id. at 140. 
 19. Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n v. United States 440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979).  
 20. Id. at 477 (citation omitted). 
 21. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 22. Id. at 842–43 (1984). 
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an agency’s enabling act signals an implicit delegation by Congress of 
agency authority to resolve it.23 Second, the Court noted that it makes 
sense for courts to defer to reasonable agency statutory constructions 
because agencies have greater policy expertise and political 
accountability than courts.24 
By relying on an implicit delegation premise, Chevron purported 
to shift responsibility for judicial deference from the courts to 
Congress. In other words, courts must apply rationality review 
because Congress told them to do so (though not out loud), rather 
than because the courts themselves have concluded that it would be a 
good idea to defer to an expert agency. Viewed from this angle, one 
might say that Chevron imputes to Congress an implicit intent to 
amend the APA’s instruction in § 706(2) that courts should determine 
issues of law. This characterization is problematic for at least two 
reasons. First, at no point in the Chevron decision did the Court 
discuss or even cite the APA.25 Second, the APA itself instructs courts 
that they should refrain from holding that a later statute has amended 
the APA unless the later statute does so expressly.26 
Empirical investigation suggests that the Court’s flexible and 
creative approach to judicial deference doctrines, though catnip for 
administrative-law scholars, may not actually affect case outcomes 
very often. Courts affirm agencies at similar rates regardless of 
whether they purport to apply Skidmore or Chevron deference.27 Still, 
Chevron has been regarded in many quarters as very strong 
medicine—stripping from courts their Marbury power to declare 
definitive interpretations of law and ceding it to agencies. 
Accordingly, the Court has devised a set of threshold tests for 
determining which agency statutory constructions deserve Chevron 
deference. Commentators christened these inquiries “Step Zero.”28 
 
 23. Id. at 844. 
 24. Id. at 865–66. 
 25. Cf. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 241 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting 
“[t]here is some question whether Chevron was faithful to the text of the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA), which it did not even bother to cite”). 
 26. 5 U.S.C. § 559 (2012). 
 27. See David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135, 173–76 (2010) 
(summarizing empirical studies showing that the ostensible standard of review does not seem to 
affect agency affirmance rates on judicial review to any great degree). 
 28. See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 190–91 (2006). 
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The lead Step Zero case is United States v. Mead Corp.,29 which 
strongly reiterated that Chevron deference turns on congressional 
intent. It declared that Chevron should apply “when it appears that 
Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules 
carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming 
deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”30 A year 
later, however, in Barnhart v. Walton,31 the Court explained that the 
applicability of Chevron should turn on factors including “the 
interstitial nature of the legal question, the related expertise of the 
Agency, the importance of the question to administration of the 
statute, the complexity of that administration, and the careful 
consideration the Agency has given the question over a long period of 
time.”32 Thus, the true test for applying Chevron is whether, under all 
the relevant circumstances, the Court thinks it would be a good idea 
to do so. As many have recognized, the implicit delegation of 
Chevron is an obvious fiction.33 
In Mayo, the Court confronted the issue of whether National 
Muffler deference—a cousin of Skidmore—or the Chevron 
framework should apply to a regulation that Treasury had adopted 
pursuant to its general authority but after the notice-and-comment 
process.34 The Court made short work of abandoning National 
Muffler, noting that it was “not inclined to carve out an approach to 
administrative review good for tax law only.”35 Applying Chevron’s 
Step Zero, the Court concluded that Congress had delegated 
authority to Treasury to imbue its statutory constructions with the 
force of law, and Treasury had invoked this authority by using notice-
and-comment procedures to issue the rule in question.36 Chevron 
deference therefore applied to the statutory interpretation embedded 
in the rule. 
 
 29. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).  
 30. Id. at 226–27.   
 31. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002). 
 32. Id. at 222. 
 33. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2379 (2001) 
(characterizing the implicit delegation underlying Chevron deference as a “fictional 
presumption”); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 
1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 517 (1989) (characterizing Chevron deference as based on a “fictional, 
presumed intent”). 
 34. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 713 (2011). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 713–14. 
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The Court’s decision to abandon National Muffler in favor of 
Chevron was eminently sensible. Judicial review doctrines are 
needlessly complex, and they do not seem to influence case outcomes 
much. The Court might as well simplify the law of scope of review by 
abandoning doctrinal variations as long as the costs do not seem high. 
Here, the Mayo fix was cheap and easy. Applying the Chevron 
framework rather than National Muffler to Treasury’s general 
authority regulations will likely change nothing in the real world 
other than simplifying brief and opinion writing. Of course, this cheap 
and easy fix also expanded, a little, the long Chevron tradition of 
ignoring the APA. 
II.  COURTS SHOULD THINK HARD BEFORE IMPOSING A COSTLY 
FIX FOR THE NOTICE-AND-COMMENT GAP 
Mayo establishes that the Chevron framework applies to 
Treasury’s general authority regulations just as it applies in other 
contexts of administrative law. This conclusion might in turn suggest a 
broader “no exceptions” approach to the applicability of doctrines of 
general administrative law. Following this approach, the general 
principles governing when an agency should have to use notice-and-
comment procedures to promulgate a rule should apply without 
change to Treasury. That Mayo rested on a determination that 
general authority regulations can carry the force of law strengthens 
this argument insofar as regulations that carry the force of law 
generally require notice-and-comment procedures. 
Courts should nonetheless think long and hard before 
aggressively applying notice-and-comment requirements to 
Treasury’s general authority rules without adjusting to their special 
context. As discussed below, whereas closing the Chevron gap was 
very cheap, closing the notice-and-comment gap could prove quite 
costly. Moreover, the primary reason for this cost is that the courts, 
through extremely creative construction of the APA, have made 
notice-and-comment procedures very expensive. Worsening matters, 
these same courts have never been able to devise a clear test for 
determining which rules require notice-and-comment and which do 
not. It might therefore behoove courts to apply the creativity and 
flexibility that they have applied in other contexts of administrative 
law to avoid imposing dubious procedural burdens on Treasury’s 
efforts to implement our magnificently complex tax code. 
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A. The Judicial Rewrite of Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking 
Perhaps the best example of the courts’ creative approach to 
fashioning modern administrative law is their rewrite of the APA’s 
notice-and-comment procedures. In 1946, the APA contemplated a 
simple, undemanding system for gathering information concerning 
legislative rules from interested persons. Modern notice-and-
comment rulemaking, in all its baroque glory, bears only a distant 
resemblance to this original model.37 Very briefly, a few highlights of 
the judicial rewrite include: drastically expanded obligations for 
notices of proposed rulemaking; an extra-statutory duty to respond to 
any comments a court deems material; “concise” explanations of rules 
that are anything but concise; and an intrusive form of arbitrariness 
review. 
1. Notice.  Section 553 of the APA provides that an agency 
initiating legislative rulemaking must give notice of “either the terms 
or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and 
issues involved.”38 These days, the idea that an agency would try to 
get away with a notice that merely offers a “description of the 
subjects and issues involved” borders on the comical. Courts have 
long insisted that agencies publish in their notices all of the technical 
and scientific information upon which they relied in forming their 
proposed rules.39 
2. Comments and the Concise General Statement of Basis and 
Purpose. Section 553 instructs agencies to give “interested persons an 
opportunity to participate in rule making through submission of 
written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral 
presentation.”40 The APA does not tell agencies what to do with these 
comments other than to consider “relevant matter presented.”41 
When issuing rules, agencies must incorporate a “concise general 
statement of their basis and purpose.”42 
 
 37. For more details on this transformation, see generally Pierce, supra note 9. 
 38. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3) (2012). 
 39. See, e.g., United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 251 (2d Cir. 
1977); see also Pierce, supra note 9, at 13 (detailing judicial transformation of the notice 
requirement for notice-and-comment rulemaking). 
 40. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c).  
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
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The “concise” part of this requirement is another bit of comedy. 
Agency explanations for their rules are famously long, detailed, and 
complex.43 One of the main reasons why agencies ignore this APA 
requirement is that courts require these explanations to include a 
response to any “significant” comment—and courts have the final call 
on what is significant.44 
3. Arbitrariness review. Under § 706(2), the factual and policy 
determinations underlying rules promulgated through notice-and-
comment are subject to arbitrariness review. At the time of the 
APA’s adoption, arbitrariness review was understood to be extremely 
lax. For example, in Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White,45 the 
Supreme Court declared that a rule should survive review for 
arbitrariness under the Due Process Clause so long as “any state of 
facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it.”46 Modern 
arbitrariness review, by contrast, insists that an agency’s 
contemporaneous explanation for a rule (i.e., its not-so-concise 
general statement) demonstrate to a reviewing court’s satisfaction 
that the agency based its action on consideration of relevant factors 
and avoided any clear error of judgment.47 Not to put too fine a point 
on it, this is a lot harder than it sounds. 
The upshot of this judicial rewrite is that notice-and-comment 
rulemaking is no longer a simple effort to take reasonable steps to 
ensure that interested persons have a chance to share information 
they deem pertinent with an agency.48 “Informal” rulemaking has 
 
 43. See Richard Parker, The Empirical Roots of the “Regulatory Reform” Movement: A 
Critical Appraisal, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 359, 397 (2006) (observing that agencies offer “extremely 
long explanations densely packed with technical detail and responsive to a host of comments but 
targeted only at an insider audience” rather than the concise, general statement required by the 
APA). 
 44. See, e.g., Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1973) 
(explaining agency obligation to respond to “significant” comments submitted during the 
notice-and-comment process).  
 45. Pac. States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176 (1935). 
 46. Id. at 185 (quoting Borden’s Farm Prods. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 194, 209 (1934)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 47. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 
U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (quoting Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 
281, 285 (1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (providing the modern, canonical 
description of arbitrariness review of policy decisions); see also Stephen R. Johnson, Reasoned 
Explanation and IRS Adjudication, 63 DUKE L.J. 1771, 1783–86 (2014) (providing more details 
on the evolution of arbitrariness review). 
 48. Pierce, supra note 9, at 12 (observing that the “judicial version of APA section 553 
bears no relationship to the requirements imposed by statute”). 
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been formalized into a type of on-the-record proceeding that is highly 
complex and burdensome. Due in large part to this judicially driven 
transformation, ending the notice-and-comment gap—unlike Mayo’s 
fix of the Chevron gap—could prove very expensive.49 
B. It Is Not Easy to Tell Interpretative from Legislative Rules 
Resolving the notice-and-comment gap turns on one of the most 
lasting and tricky problems presented by the APA—drawing the line 
between interpretative rules (which do not require notice-and-
comment procedures), and legislative rules (which generally do 
require them). Reflecting this difficulty, the D.C. Circuit has said on 
more than one occasion that these distinctions are “enshrouded in 
considerable smog.”50 Although a full exploration of this problem is 
far beyond the scope of this short essay, a few details follow. 
One of the most influential efforts to pierce through the smog 
came in American Mining Congress v. Mine Safety & Health 
Administration,51 authored by Judge Williams, a former professor of 
administrative law. He noted that the court’s inquiry had generally 
hinged on whether a rule had the force of law.52 An agency rule will 
carry the force of law so long as Congress has delegated legislative 
rulemaking authority to the agency, and the agency has invoked it.53 
Judge Williams identified several ways to determine if an agency has 
invoked legislative rulemaking authority. The easiest case is where an 
agency expressly states that it has done so. In addition, a rule is 
legislative where “in the absence of the rule there would not be an 
adequate legislative basis for enforcement action or other agency 
action to confer benefits or ensure the performance of duties.”54 This 
type of situation exists where, for example, a statute imposes no 
obligations on a regulated party other than to obey such rules as the 
Secretary might promulgate: without the rules, there is nothing to 
enforce, so the rules must be legislative. Also, a rule must be 
 
 49. See id. at 15 (describing potentially “devastating” costs of imposing full-blown notice-
and-comment procedures on Treasury’s general authority regulations). But cf. id. at 20–23 
(suggesting a potential means to mitigate these costs).   
 50. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d 1561, 1565 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) 
(quoting Am. Bus. Ass’n v. United States, 627 F.2d 525, 529 (D.C. Cir. 1980)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 51. Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106 (D.C. Cir. 1993).  
 52. Id. at 1109. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 1112. 
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legislative if it “effectively amends a prior legislative rule,” because 
the two are irreconcilable.55 At bottom, the American Mining 
Congress approach thus asks whether a rule makes new law or, in a 
variation on this same theme, changes old law. Applying this 
approach in a given case can remain, of course, very difficult. 
Another influential line of analysis approaches the problem from 
the opposite direction, inquiring whether a rule can be fairly said to 
interpret another statute or rule.56 This approach is naturally 
problematic insofar as the line between interpreting law and creating 
law is fuzzy. One guide that appears in the cases is that glosses on 
extremely vague language (e.g., the term “reasonable”) tend to be 
legislative.57 Another guide is that an agency may find difficulty 
interpreting its way from general, qualitative language to precise, 
quantitative rules.58 
Another approach, which Professor Hickman favors, focuses on 
whether a rule binds both the promulgating agency and regulated 
parties, and also imposes penalties for noncompliance.59 Professor 
Hickman has concluded, quite broadly, that “all Treasury regulations 
are legislative rules—whether they were promulgated under specific 
authority or I.R.C. § 7805(a) general authority—for the simple reason 
that they are legally binding on taxpayers and the government 
alike.”60 On this view, absent application of some other exception, 
these rules require notice-and-comment procedures. 
 
 55. Id. 
 56. See, e.g., Air Transp. Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. FAA, 291 F.3d 49, 55–56 (D.C. Cir. 2002) 
(explaining that one factor determining whether a rule is interpretative is whether it spells out a 
“duty fairly encompassed within the regulation that the interpretation purports to construe” 
(quoting Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena LP, 117 F.3d 579, 588 (D.C. Cir. 1997) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 117 F.3d at 588 (“The 
distinction between an interpretative and substantive rule more likely turns on how tightly the 
agency’s interpretation is drawn linguistically from the actual language of the statute or rule.”).  
 57. See United Techs. Corp. v. EPA, 821 F.2d 714, 719–20 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“If, however, 
the rule is based on an agency’s power to exercise its judgment as to how best to implement a 
general statutory mandate, the rule is likely a legislative one.”).  
 58. See Hoctor v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 82 F.3d 165, 170 (7th Cir. 1996) (concluding that 
requirement of an eight-foot fence could not be fairly characterized as an interpretation of 
general duty of secure containment).  
 59. See Hickman, supra note 4, at 529; see generally Thomas Merrill & Kathryn Tongue 
Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467 
(2002). 
 60. See Hickman, supra note 5, at 1773. 
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C. Due (and Pragmatic) Regard to History 
Invoking “smoggy” doctrine to end the notice-and-comment gap 
could require a major and costly change in Treasury’s rulemaking 
procedures, in large part due to the courts’ creative rewrite of the 
APA. If these points have any merit, perhaps they counsel that courts 
should, if confronted with this problem, devote a bit of their judicial 
creativity to characterizing Treasury’s general authority rules, or at 
least many of them, as interpretative—even if this requires some 
fumbling through the smog. 
This general approach would be consonant with a long judicial 
tradition that accords great weight to longstanding administrative 
statutory constructions and practices, counseling that they should not 
be “overturned except for cogent reasons.”61 As Professor Bryan T. 
Camp’s contribution to this symposium explains, Treasury’s 
categorization of its general authority rules as interpretative evolved 
before the courts accepted that agencies could engage in subordinate 
legislation.62 Under this conceptual framework, an agency rule could 
not be legislative because it would then usurp legislative authority, 
violating separation of powers.63 Even though Treasury could not 
legislate, however, it nonetheless had to issue the rules necessary to 
implement tax law sensibly. This circumstance naturally necessitated 
a very generous understanding of the scope of the concept of an 
interpretative rule. 
One might think that adoption of the APA, with its ringing 
endorsement of the existence of legislative rules, should have led 
courts and commentators to revisit this issue. They might have 
reasoned that, now that the law recognized agency power to impose 
legislative rules, Treasury no longer needed speciously to characterize 
rules that actually make law into an overly expansive “interpretative” 
 
 61. United States v. Chi., N. Shore & Milwaukee R.R. Co., 288 U.S. 1, 13 (1933); see also 
supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 62. See Bryan T. Camp, A History of Tax Regulation Prior to the Administrative Procedure 
Act, 63 DUKE L.J. 1673, 1710 (2014) (explaining that tax regulations circa 1920 had to be 
regarded as interpretative to be legitimate because, if they were legislative, they would 
necessarily be “invalid exercises of power”). 
 63. See id. (stating that “[r]egulations that went beyond interpretations were invalid 
exercises of power precisely because they were legislative in character”); see also Hickman, 
supra note 5, at 1761–62 (observing that “[i]n the first part of the twentieth century, the general 
consensus among courts and scholars held that a general authority grant that authorized legally 
binding regulations would violate the nondelegation doctrine and thus be constitutionally 
invalid”). 
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pigeonhole, which could be suitably contracted. They did not, 
however, seize this opportunity. The common view after adoption of 
the APA, shared by Professor Kenneth Culp Davis, continued to be 
that most Treasury regulations were interpretative.64 The persistence 
of this view is, of course, itself strong evidence that rational minds can 
accept a capacious understanding of interpretative rules. 
Courts confronting the notice-and-comment gap will face a 
choice. Following the path suggested by Mayo and advised by 
Professor Hickman, they might aggressively apply “modern” and 
“general” law to determine that Treasury’s general authority rules are 
legislative and, thus, only legal if they were promulgated via notice-
and-comment procedures. Alternatively, courts can give weight to 
tax’s particular history and needs in order to justify a generous, 
flexible approach to the category of interpretative rules. This Essay 
suggests that courts take the latter stance, which is consistent with the 
pragmatic, flexible approach that administrative law has often 
followed in the past. 
CONCLUSION 
Treasury’s treatment of its general authority regulations as 
interpretative has come under sustained and powerful scholarly fire 
for violating generally applicable administrative law. This Essay does 
not attempt to give a definitive response to this critique. Instead, it 
merely suggests that courts, when they address this problem, adopt a 
pragmatic and conservative attitude consistent with the better angels 
of administrative law’s nature. The traditions of administrative law 
leave room for a generous interpretation of the term “interpretative.” 
Courts should consider that, unlike Mayo’s fix of the Chevron gap, 
closing the notice-and-comment gap could prove extremely costly. 
Given that the courts played a major role in creating these costs 
through creative interpretation of the APA, one might even go so far 
as to say that they owe Treasury a bit of interpretative generosity. 
 
 64.  Camp, supra note 62, at 1714. 
